Archeologické rozhledy

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Obsah
In March 1992 we invited Ian Hodder to give a series of lectures in Prague and we were extremely grateful when he accepted our invitation. Hodder’s following paper, one of those he presented during his visit, seemed to us to be a very clear and concise exposition of current post-processual views. It was Václav Matoušek’s idea, if we are not mistaken, to ask for a written version of it for the purpose of publishing it in Czech translation. We still hope that this will be carried out in the near future.

In the meantime, however, we felt that the paper should also be published in English in one of our periodicals and that some Czech archaeologists should be asked for their comments. In undertaking the decision to carry out this idea, we did not impose any limitations upon the authors with the exception that we urged everybody to express their views concisely. Our intention was to obtain a more or less spontaneous reaction by archaeologists who had had little or no contact with post-processual archaeology previously.

We solicited Hodder’s manuscript to far more archaeologists for comment than those who eventually contributed to the debate. One reason for this may be that we did not ask anybody twice. Besides that, some archaeologists probably did not feel competent to react to what apparently seemed to them to be very general matters. Thus, the set of authors participating in the debate does not represent, for various reasons, all those Czech archaeologists who, in our view, would be competent to contribute.

Analyzing the individual contributions it becomes obvious at a first glance that only some of them fully concentrated on problems discussed in Hodder’s paper, while others included other topics as well. Because Hodder more or less exhausted the main field of ideas usually considered to constitute post-processual archaeology, the extra topics show what Czech archaeologists might feel to be theoretically important in addition to the post-processual spectrum. Here again we do not comment.

Ian Hodder’s Prague stay was unusually successful, judging from the unusually large audience visiting his lectures and taking part in the discussions which immediately followed. It was commented on by other authors as well as being an inspiring event in Czech archaeology (Z. Smetánka 1992). Taking into account the fact that until recently archaeological and general social theory was largely neglected among Czech archaeologists, we are surprised by positive reactions to so many post-processual thoughts. One of the main questions, however, is how these theoretical thoughts will be reflected in particular research projects; but this is a problem acutely felt everywhere.

All the contributions which follow have been edited by the authors of this introduction, with the additional assistance of Mark Beech who attempted to correct the English of all the submitted papers.
Bibliography

During the 1980's archaeological theory in the English-speaking world began to recognize and deal with three closely-linked problems. The first was a realisation of the poverty of arguments about the past which were limited to adaptive, ecological and functional relationships. Already, in the work of archaeologists such as Clarke (1972), Renfrew (1973), Flannery (1976) and Friedman and Rowlands (1977) attention had turned to the incorporation of social questions into archaeological debate. Issues such as ranking and the spatial organisation of societies were seen as relevant to evolutionary change. This more humanistic concern with social questions led in turn in the 1980's to the incorporation of symbolism into archaeological theory (Renfrew 1982; Leon 1982) and to a wider debate about the nature of material culture as a signifying system - as a text, to be read by people in the past and present (Hodder 1986; Shanks and Tilley 1987). Material culture was seen as meaningful rather than as a distorted fossil record of past behaviour. At the minimum, this wider debate in archaeological theory shows that too much of the archaeological data are left unaccounted for if reasoning is restricted to adaptive and ecological accounts.

The second problem which began to be addressed in the 1980's was the processual archaeological view that material culture is passive and that human beings are passive. Within the systematic models suggested by Flannery and Renfrew, for example, human beings are controlled by systems which they do not comprehend. Indeed, the thoughts, intentions and strategies of human agents are not thought of as relevant to long-term change. Thus material culture is simply the passive by-product of the efficient running of the system. The intentions of the producers and the meanings given to the products by the users are not thought to be relevant to archaeological study of long-term adaptive change. In the 1980's there began to be an increasing concern with the role of agency in social change and the role of material culture as actively constructing that change (Hodder 1982; 1986). The most productive direction in which this line of enquiry has been taken is into material culture as ideology and into the ideological framework for domination and resistance (Miller and Tilley 1984; Miller, Rowlands and Tilley 1989; McGuire and Paynter 1990). For example, Fergusson (1990) has shown how pots and rituals were used by North American slaves as part of a resistance to white domination.

The third problem with early processual archaeology which began to be exposed in the 1980s was part of a broader transformation within anthropology as a whole. Increasingly history ceased to be viewed disparagingly as descriptive and particularistic. There was a reaction against the over-stressing of generalisations. In archaeology it proved difficult to identify 'law-like' generalisations which were more than self-evident or trivial (Flannery 1973). There was an increasing acceptance that generalisation had to be tempered by in-depth contextual understanding - a temporal version of Geertz' (1973) 'thick description'.
These three issues (the importance of meaning, agency and history) gradually came to be accepted within processual archaeology, either through internal development (Renfrew 1982; Flannery and Marcus 1983) or in reaction to the critique by post-processual archaeology. Some examples of recent attempts to incorporate some aspects of post-processual archaeology into an advanced or cognitive processual archaeology are provided by Earle and Preucel (1987), Renfrew (1989), Renfrew and Bahn (1989), and Mithen (1990). (For a general review of the relationships between processual and post-processual archaeology see Preucel 1991 and Hodder 1992).

These attempts to reach a compromise between processual and post-processual archaeology, at least in terms of the three problems dealt with above, gloss over an important epistemological difference. As processual archaeology has gradually tried to incorporate symbolic meaning, human agency and historical context, it has met difficulties in accommodating these new considerations within a positivist framework. This philosophical issue has been fully discussed by Wylie (1989). A dilemma existed in positivist processual archaeology before any attempt to interpret past symbolism, but it was thrown into focus by that attempt. In essence the problem is that archaeologists had espoused first empiricist and then positivist perspectives according to which they could only test hypotheses which concerned the observable world. And yet archaeologists want to go beyond their data to make statements about the dynamics of past societies. They want to make statements about behaviour, economic and social structures and so on which go beyond the data and are not themselves observable. Archaeologists felt that they could ignore this dilemma so long as they could argue for deterministic links from the material to the non-material. But the attempt to get at past symbolism undermines any such argument. The very definition of a symbol normally includes some reference to its arbitrary nature. Few people would argue that the symbolic meaning of an artifact can be determined cross-culturally. How could a positivist approach possibly deal with the arbitrary nature of the sign?

The dilemma was exacerbated as the notion of material culture as a text began to take a clearer form. The view that material culture is meaningfully constituted takes us close to the realisation that the meaning of an artifact does not simply derive from its production but also from its use and perception by others. The main purpose of the claim that in some respects the metaphor of the text is appropriate for material culture, is to move archaeologists away from the notion that the data are a passive record with only one meaning. Different people will have read the 'text' differently, in different contexts. It is not a large leap from this last statement to the realisation that archaeologists too, in their different and changing contexts, will 'read the past' differently. If the meaning of a text is not equivalent to the intention of the author, or the context of production and use, but includes the readings made by 'them' and by 'us', then how can we know how 'they' were reading the material culture? Is any reading made by archaeologists, and indeed by non-archaeologists equally valid? The spectre of relativism haunts archaeology.

Positivist processual archaeologists try to avoid this issue by retaining a commitment to testing theories on independent and objective data. Such an approach may work pragmatically in sciences which deal with a single herme-
neutic. Physics and biology, for example, deal with only one framework of meaning (our own) in attempting to describe natural phenomena in our terms. The humanistic and social sciences (including archaeology), however, deal with a double hermeneutic since the objects studied in 'our' terms also have another meaning in 'their' terms. The problem becomes one of translation. The processual, hypotheses-testing approach might work adequately for a single hermeneutic and for the 'hard' science aspects of archaeological enquiry (though even here, as with radiometric dating, interpretive issues are in my view involved, but it deals less well with the double hermeneutic. I want to show an example how such hypothesis-testing procedures are undermined when archaeologists are dealing with past symbolism.

The example I wish to use is Renfrew's (1985) interpretation of a sanctuary at Phylakopi in the Bronze Age Aegean. At this site, Renfrew had found a building which he wished to interpret as a sanctuary or shrine for religious behaviour. In order to test this hypothesis, he followed a typically processual procedure. He undertook a survey of the anthropological literature on religion and came up with a list of material expectations for religious sanctuaries. For example, there should be images of the divine, special gestures as in adoration, and attention-focussing devices. He then checks this list against the evidence from Phylakopi and finds that there is a good fit. For example, large figurines represent divine images with their hands raised in special gestures, and the platforms in the building represent attention-focussing devices. The hypothesis that the building is for religious purposes is confirmed.

In the natural and physical sciences such a procedure would appear acceptable. But when we are dealing with a double hermeneutic, the objectivity of the data is less secure. Renfrew wants to test his theories against data without making intuitive leaps. But perhaps 'the data' meant different things to people living in the past. For example, how can we be sure that a large figurine is a god, or that the gestures are religious, or that a platform focussed attention? Renfrew's supposed objective procedure is in fact based on subjective statements about what the data meant and mean. He ends up imposing meaning from the outside without trying to understand what the data meant to the inhabitants of Phylakopi.

A more adequate testing of Renfrew's theory that the building was a shrine would, in my view follow a different procedure, not in terms of the use of generalisation since that is clearly needed in any archaeological interpretation but in terms of the approach to data. It is necessary to recognize that archaeologists deal with a double hermeneutic. We need to try to understand what the building and what 'religion' meant to 'them'. The data are of course 'objective' in the sense that they have certain universal physical properties, but they are not 'objective' in the sense that they have universal meaning. They are perceived differently by different people in their different cultures and so we cannot test our theories objectively.

In order to understand what the building meant to 'them', in my view a contextual approach should be followed. My first question would be 'how does the building differ from other buildings on the site?' Renfrew gives us few clues about the full range of artifacts, sherd sizes, activity traces, discard patterns, faunal differences between the building and supposed 'domestic'
houses. Was there more evidence of feasting, different approaches to refuse, different types of figurine? In this way one could, for example, explore the assumption that religion was separate from domestic activities at this time period. Perhaps 'they' viewed religion very differently. The aim would be to relate our general understanding of religion to specific contextual patterning. This alternative procedure involves not only searching for correspondence (fit) with the data, but also at internal coherence. If the building really was a religious shrine, then all aspects of different types of data, from refuse patterns to faunal assemblages should be affected. A coherent argument has to be made which makes sense of 'the whole'. If the building was really religious in a sense different from our own, being more closely tied to mundane everyday activities, then we have to adjust our expectations to make coherent sense of the whole. What I am describing here is the hermeneutic procedure which I think most archaeologists implicitly use. It involves searching for data correspondence within a theory which makes coherent sense of as much of data as possible.

I have used hermeneutic procedures of this type in work on the meaning of Neolithic long barrows (Hodder 1990). I do not claim that long burial mounds universally mean houses. I cannot objectively test the theory that they mean houses using universal instruments of measurement. What I can do though is show that there are internal relationships within the data which support the hypothesis. In particular, in a number of specific ways, the tombs look like houses. This 'objective' similarity of form does not necessarily imply similarity of meaning. But the correspondence is supported by other factors (such as that the tombs are sometimes built over houses or settlements) and by a coherent theory which explains why tombs should be built like houses in the particular economic and social context of Neolithic North-west Europe. A hermeneutic procedure has led to a plausible account of a set of meanings different from our own.

Many processual archaeologists have today become very pessimistic about saying anything about the past. They realize that the data are theory laden and they recognize that meaning does not lie in the object but in the interpreter. And yet they want to retain a commitment to positivism and objectivity. The result is paralysis. The contradiction cannot be dealt with in positivist terms.

An alternative, hermeneutic approach, which can deal with the contradictions depends on arguments of coherence of a whole (not universality) in conjunction with correspondence to the data. But post-processual archaeologists tend to recognize that even correspondence and coherence are not sufficient in the evaluation of plausible hypotheses. Two other factors are the social 'usefulness' of the theory and the 'rhetoric' used.

The first issue derives from critical theory and feminism and concerns the relations of power which lie behind the interpretations we give to the past. The term 'discourse' is often used here to mean 'situated communication'. In other words, what we write and find plausible as archaeologists depends on how our discussion is historically, materially, socially and politically situated. This issue has been discussed very effectively by feminists who have showed the gender biases evident in even the most descriptive and objective accounts (Gero and Conkey 1991). Also, archaeology has traditionally been linked to the interests
of those in the middle and upper classes in Europe. More recently, indigenous groups around the world have expressed their own interpretations and claims on the past (e.g. Condori 1989). It has become increasingly important to analyse critically the disciplinary and wider social context within which certain statements appear to have truth value.

A second, closely related issue is the strategy used in archaeological writing. Archaeologists have not, on the whole, examined the way they write or the relationship between their writing and the audience to whom it is addressed. But the plausibility of an account depends very much on the rhetoric that is used. Critical analyses of archaeological writing (e.g. Hodder 1989) and new experimental forms of writing (e.g. Spector 1991) are now being undertaken.

Far from the simplistic and contradictory views of processual archaeologists, post-processual archaeology accepts that the 'truth' or plausibility of an archaeological hypothesis is a complicated, and social, matter. It involves correspondence, but also coherence, social context and rhetoric.

MAIN INFLUENCES IN POST-PROCESSUAL ARCHAEOLOGY
Despite the common underlying themes described above, post-processual archaeology is highly diverse. Indeed, rather than embracing a new overall paradigm, it is simply 'post'. United in criticism of processual archaeology there is a great variety of possible responses. Nevertheless there are four strands which can be seen in current debates in English-speaking archaeological theory which go beyond an ecological perspective.

The first is Marxism. Since Marxism is itself today highly diverse it is difficult to be precise about its impact on post-processual archaeology (but see McGuire 1992). Certainly in Britain and Scandinavia the influence of structural-Marxism, through the work of Friedman and Rowlands (1977), has been considerable (for example, Frankenstei and Rowlands 1978; Kristiansen 1981; Gledhill 1978; Bender 1978). These approaches placed a new emphasis on internal contradiction and conflict leading to change, and they gave social rather than economic relations a dominant role. But, rather than fitting into aspects of the Marxist tradition which emphasised explanation as being specific and historical and which problematised the relationship between hypotheses and data, the archaeological applications of Althusserian structural-Marxism often retained an evolutionism, materialism and positivism which did little to threaten the processual paradigm. It was, by contrast, the Marxist notions of ideology, however, which did lead to a more fundamental reevaluation (Miller and Tilley 1984). Rather than restricting ideology to the dominant ideology, it has been possible to see ideology as related to interest. Different groups in society are able to develop competing ideologies. Thus ideology is constructed within relations of domination and is closely connected with power. The influence of Foucault (1977) has been considerable in that power is seen as being part of a power/knowledge/truth network (Shanks and Tilley 1987a,b). Power over others through the control of material resources has to be linked to the valuation, prestige and knowledge allocated to those resources. Even subordinate groups are able to manipulate the meanings of material culture in order to resist and act against oppression. While the contribution of a distincti-
vley Marxist perspective to these ideas is difficult to distinguish, recent publications (e.g. Miller, Rowlands and Tilley 1989; McGuire and Paynter 1991) have shown a close affiliation with post-processual concerns. Kohl (1985, p. 112) talks of a "subtier historical materialism along which ideas and materials actively and continuously interact with one other".

If some western European Marxist archaeology has become blurred as it has contributed to and merged with post-processual archaeology, the same can be said for structuralism. The initial influence of structuralism in archaeology was important because, like Marxism, it introduced the notion of structures behind systems. It also provided a method for approaching symbolic codes. But the critique of structuralism was quickly established (Shanks and Tilley 1987). Within a contextual archaeology (Hodder 1986), the emphasis on structured frameworks of meaning is retained, at least in the initial stages of analysis before the transformation of meanings in situated, practical contexts is explored. Post-processual archaeologists may still employ structuralist oppositions in their attempts to reconstruct specific historical contexts. The further transformation of structuralism into post-structuralism (Bapty and Yates 1990; Tilley 1990) provides another strand of post-processual diversity. Opposed to the reconstruction of original contextual meanings, and opposed to the notion of agency, post-structuralist archaeology explores 'floating' chains of signifiers and leads to a radical undermining of the discipline of archaeology.

A third strand within post-processual archaeology is that influenced by various forms of critical theory. Associated particularly with the work of Leone (1982; Potter and Shackel 1987), this approach has emphasised the role of archaeology in furthering the dominant ideologies of capitalism and has explored alternative ways of empowering people to critique these ideologies. Once again these ideas have been absorbed into post-processual archaeology and are difficult to distinguish, although there are certainly differences in the commitments expressed towards science and objectivity.

A fourth strand is feminism. I hesitate to include this component since important differences have emerged between some post-processual writing and gender archaeology (Gero and Conkey 1991). For example, the apparent commitment to some form of relativism and free-play in post-structuralist writing appears insufficiently engaged politically for some feminists, and it undermines their claims concerning the real material oppression of women in society. Nevertheless, I would argue that feminism forms an important component in post-processual archaeology, because of its concern with meaning, other voices, agency, power, process and the past as construction. Indeed, many of the more active early post-processual writers have since spearheaded the introduction of a politically aware gender archaeology (e.g. Gero and Conkey 1991; Moore 1986; Wylie 1990). There is much variation within gender archaeology and some attempts simply to reconstruct what women were doing in the past fit easily into a processual approach (e.g. Ehrenburg 1989). However, a politically active gender archaeology certainly contributes to, as well as confronts, a value-committed archaeology.

It might be argued that, given all the diversity within and outside post-processual archaeology, there is little point in using a common term. This is particularly true when we include the accommodations being made within
processual archaeology (see the discussion earlier of the work of Flannery, Renfrew and others). In some quarters a narrow processual view is retained, particularly in the United States of America. In such contexts the processual/post-processual debate still has some relevance. But for most archaeologists the dichotomy can probably not remain a helpful one. Rather than worrying about who is processual and who post-processual, archaeologists are increasingly getting on with dealing with the new range of questions that are raised - such as the nature of material culture meanings, the relationship between discard and power, the changing role of gender relations in prehistory, the social history of archaeology, and so on. The processual/post-processual debate raised some questions. We now have to answer them.

References

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I find little to disagree with in Ian Hodder's general overview of post-processual archaeology, and would broadly agree with his identification of the diversity of roots which form the different strands within post-processual archaeology (e.g. Marxism, structuralism, critical theory and feminism). However, I would like to also make the following comments, which I hope will shed some light on my own position, both as an archaeozoologist, and an Englishman living and working in Central Europe.

"THE GOOD"
Post-processualism has been the subject of many recent critiques, however I would like to begin by commenting on some of the positive elements I feel it has contributed towards the discipline of archaeology.

The recognition that neither material culture nor human beings were passive is an important one. It is now clear that simple data observations do not provide a transparent path towards the recreation of the past. Although this was to a certain extent already recognised earlier by the processualists.

Post-processualism has contributed much towards the destruction of the previous all embracing grand theories. It has destroyed the myth that there might exist "one proper way" of studying the past, and instead has emphasised the importance of cultural and contextual difference.

It has stressed our greater personal involvement in the dialectic between theory and data by highlighting the 'material' connections between what we actually believe, practice and create. The consequence of this being that the archaeological text is the medium in which we create meaning, the artefacts themselves externally not having "one true meaning".

Post-processualism has provided a critique of the processual or 'New' Archaeology and has attempted to emphasise the important role of various factors such as symbolism, structure and historical context within the formation of material culture. This was also important as it gave weight to the role of the dialectical relationship between the present and the past, after all we are attempting to reconstruct the past in the present, the 'subjective' past subsequently being involved in present day strategies. This is not to say that I would argue for complete relativism, but rather that I can see the value of 'different' reconstructions of the past as forming a contribution to the greater debate within the discipline, thus permitting a better discussion between differing viewpoints.

The most important contribution of post-processual archaeology is that it has raised a lot of questions, although, of course, it has not necessarily provided answers to all of them. It has also served a purpose in that it has reiterated that, "Archaeology is immediately theoretical ... (and that) ... There
can be no meaningful separation of theory, method and practice in archaeology." (Shanks and Tilley 1987a, p. 209).

"THE BAD AND THE UGLY"
A storm of critique has developed in reaction to post-processual archaeology, and I do not wish to repeat all the details of this debate. Instead I would like to comment on a few important aspects which have emerged.

Post-processual archaeology does not always seem to be quite so liberal as it would like us to believe. The more radical exponents of it appear to be completely anti-processual/anti-traditional (certainly in Britain, they are all lumped together as one bad egg) and reject anything which is not situated within its own rhetorical boundaries. This would appear to run counter to their supposed own stress for a plurality of views.

Post-processualism has not always been sufficiently dialectic regarding the relationship between the past and the present, often simply exchanging the "past" for the "present".

The intellectualisation of the theoretical debate has deepened the division between the "intellectual academics" and the "field archaeologist" or "white-coated scientist". This has perhaps even damaged rather than assisted the narrowing of the "theory-data gap".

One key problem seems to have been how material culture can simply be taken and read as a "text", to be read by people in the past and present. The use of the metaphor of "texts" seemed slightly unclear and appeared to allow for excessive relativism, in that the reading and interpretation of them seemed to be a permitted "free for all". As it has already been pointed out by many, how then could we defend one's position against dangerous groups and their 'misinterpretation' of the past, e.g. fascist archaeologies?

Finally, many people remain unconvinced by the preachings of the leading post-processualists because they have seldom attempted to apply their theoretical basis to archaeological data in anything more than an anecdotal fashion, e.g. beer cans (Shanks and Tilley 1987b).

CONTEXTUAL/INTERPRETIVE ARCHAEOZOOLOGY?
Archaeological science and more recently environmental archaeologists have recently come under the hammer of the rhetoric of the post-processualists, both at the TAG conferences of 1989 and 1990 and subsequently in print (Edmonds and Thomas 1990; Thomas 1990). Some attempt has been made to address a reply to this verbal assault (O'Connor, 1991), although it is a pity that neither side suggested a positive working agenda for the future. Both sides seemed slightly entrenched in their own positions and unwilling to discuss any form of compromise. I could see "good, bad and ugly" in both sides, with much repetition of the now increasingly tedious processual versus post-processual battlefield injuries.

I would therefore like to suggest some perhaps more positive strategy for the future, and will discuss this problem in relation to my own particular field of interest, archaeozoology.

I would personally favour the adoption of a 'contextual' approach, as has been advocated by Hodder (1982; 1986) for several reasons. I find myself more
sympathetic towards his attempts to bridge the "theory-data gap" than some of the more radical post-processualists. His more recent article putting forward an 'interpretive' archaeology (Hodder 1991) rightly criticises the intellectualisation of archaeological theory and points out how it appears to be coming increasingly separate from the material data.

The idea of context is of course not a new one, nevertheless it represents the most important basis of all our work, as to be interested in artifacts without any contextual information is akin to antiquarianism or the activities of metal detector users (Hodder 1986b, p. 120). Recognition of the importance of context is, I would argue, the basic tenet of archaeological practice.

Working as I do in the field of archaeozoology, a discipline laden with its own peculiar hybridisation of archaeological and zoological methodology and theory, it is interesting that there have been relatively few attempts to incorporate the study of faunal remains into a more contextual approach. The importance of context has recently been stressed by post-processualists, the more radical post-processualists apparently seeing little of interest in bones unless they can be interpreted in symbolical terms, in terms of the negotiation of power, etc. However, this is perhaps missing the point, as I would like to suggest that the interpretation of animal bones, whether economic or social/symbolic, should be placed within a contextual/interpretive approach. I suspect that for most archaeologists a contextual approach is unconsciously a part of their day to day practice, however archaeozoologists often seem to study their data with much of their attention focused on the animals themselves, rather than on comparing their evidence with other categories of archaeological data, e.g. comparing the spatial patterning of activity traces, discard patterns, etc., although a few rare examples exist of such work, e.g. Halstead, Hodder and Jones (1978) and Hill (1988).

The absence of evaluation of the contextual patterning as a whole is surprising considering the modern tools now available, i.e. computers and a multitude of available software (database systems, graphical and statistical packages, etc.). This is the fault of both the archaeologist and the archaeozoologist. Various factors are involved:

a) isolation - many archaeologists still have the attitude that animal bones are "environmental" and not archaeological data and that therefore they should be sent to a relevant laboratory specialist. This results in all analysis and interpretation of data being carried out independently of one another, a report being subsequently dispatched back to the archaeologist to "add onto" the final report. In some cases, there may even be a deliberate policy of publishing everything separately, e.g. the York fascicles where the archaeology, pottery, small finds and environmental data are all published separately from one another.

b) background - archaeozoologists come from a wide variety of backgrounds, e.g. zoology, biology, veterinary science, etc., and do not always have a strong background in archaeological theory. Likewise archaeologists sometimes may not appreciate the complexities of analysis and interpretation of faunal material. I myself would strongly support the school of thought that says, "first and foremost, I am an archaeologist. I am looking at animal bones to see what they can tell me about different patterns of human behaviour in the past".

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c) integration of data - there are few examples where one can honestly say that the archaeological and environmental data is successfully integrated. This is of course principally because it is not an easy task, however, perhaps also because the 'determination of bones' is still considered to be a separate task from the central core of the archaeological process.

What I would like to advocate is that the way forward for archaeozoology, and perhaps generally for environmental archaeology, is that it must re-evaluate some of the basic questions that it normally asks of its data. It is clear that one can ask more interesting questions than e.g., "What animals or plants are present on the site?". We must learn to be more creative with our questioning and to work in more closely knit research teams together as archaeologists, and not separately as archaeologists and "specialists in white coals". Only then can there be a more successful and effective contextual approach be pursued. To acknowledge the existence of context is nothing new, it was of course used within traditional and processual archaeology, nevertheless what I am trying to suggest is that archaeozoology can make a different sort of contribution within archaeology than it has done in the past. We must acknowledge that even if we continue as traditional or processual archaeozoologists we cannot ignore the impact of post-processualism and its influence on the new kinds of questions that are being asked.

POST-PROCESSUALISM AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA
I am currently living and working in the Czech Republic and would like to now continue by contributing some additional remarks regarding post-processual archaeology from the viewpoint of Central Europe. So, what is my impression of the impact of post-processual archaeology in Czechoslovakia?

One of the students from the archaeology department of Charles University, Prague, recently said to me, "the archaeology taught in universities in Czechoslovakia during the past few decades was an archaeology without theory ... simply an archaeology of chronology and typology". This statement took me by surprise, nevertheless I was curious about what they meant.

Discussion with my colleagues in the Institute appeared to largely negate this suggestion, suggesting perhaps that it was only partly true for the form of archaeology taught in universities. Theory, of course, did exist and develop elsewhere in Czechoslovak archaeology, albeit not in the Shanks and Tilley form. Neustupný (1991a) has recently carried out a summary of the theoretical explanations of particular questions within prehistoric archaeology in Czechoslovakia, pointing out the major developments: influence of the typological paradigm during the first half of the century, the impact of Marxist philosophy/training in political economy in the post-war period, the influence of Soviet archaeological/ethnographic literature in the 1950's, the pioneering in the 1960's of databases (e.g. Soudský at Bylny), statistics, information theory and mathematics (largely by Neustupný) and the interest in prehistoric economy and demography. In summarising the achievements he says that: "a lot of work has been done... (but that)... it may not yet constitute a complete break with the traditional typological paradigm (and it is doubtful whether such a break would be desirable), but we have certainly reached the take-off point." (Neustupný 1991a, p. 258)
It is interesting to note that Neustupný first prepared this text in 1987 when the "neo-Stalinist regime...would not have allowed a critical appraisal of the theoretical achievements of Czechoslovak archaeology" (Neustupný 1991, p. 260), and as he later pointed out in his 1990 postscript, writing about any theory became dangerous within the totalitarian regime, leading many people to concentrate on non-theoretical topics, although there were rare exceptions, e.g. the reviews of Hodder's volumes, "Symbols in Action" and "Symbolic and Structural Archaeology" by Kuna (1985; 1986a).

Since the 1989 revolution in Czechoslovakia many changes have taken place. The whole baggage of western paraphernalia has arrived in Prague: MacDonalds, Mutant Ninja Turtles, Playboy Magazine, as well as tram cars extolling the virtues of western cigarette companies, one brand even being called "Test the West"(!), but, what about the impact of post-processual archaeology in Czechoslovakia?

It does not appear to have had a major influence on the majority of archaeologists, who still carry out a very traditional form of archaeology, although some archaeologists have already taken some of its ideas on board, even prior to the important year of 1989 (see below). There were of course various problems inherent to the previous system which prevented transmission of ideas during the past decades, such as: language barriers, academic isolation, lack of foreign travel, contacts, literature, etc., however now with the exception of the language barrier, there are generally not as many obstacles. So why the lack of interest?

Perhaps we must consider some of the main influences in post-processual archaeology, identified by Hodder. I can understand the certain amount of suspicion that some colleagues in Prague have of certain elements within the post-processual debate. For example, a simple encounter with words or phrases such as 'Marxism', 'notions of ideology', 'structures behind systems' and 'critical theory ... furthering the dominant ideologies of capitalism' send shivers down the spines of many archaeologists here, who having lived through more than 40 years of communism, would prefer to see a clean break from the past.

Feminism, as far as I can make out, never made a very great impact in Czechoslovakia, and seems to be regarded with suspicion and partly with amusement (even amongst the usual trendy student brigade!). The reasons for the minimal impact of feminism in Czechoslovakia may be numerous, e.g. religion (catholicism), structure of the social system and economic reasons. It certainly does not seem to feature strongly within Czech society, although small groups of activists do exist. Although during the past year I believe a course in Gender Studies has been set up at Charles University in Prague, so it is something which may yet develop more strongly. Since 1989 the political changes in Czechoslovakia, including the recent separation of the country into the newly formed Czech and Slovak Republics, are leading to a redrawing of horizons. The reconstruction of the basic tenets of archaeological practice is currently underway, hand in hand with the possibilities for new alliances in theory. For some time now, even prior to 1989, there has been a shift away from the previously strong German traditional archaeology of chronology and typology, towards a developing interest in a different type of theoretical archaeology and one can even discern the influence of post-processual thinking, e.g.
in the symbolic interpretation of copper by Kuna (1986b; 1988) and the explanation of some prehistoric pottery forms by Neustupný (1991b). More recently the impact of post-processualism on medieval archaeology in Britain has been discussed by Gojda (1992). He has pointed out how British post-processualists appear to be largely "middle class academic staff standing traditionally on the left wing against the conservative state establishment, supported by young-radical-graduate students" (Gojda 1992, p. 292), and appears to find some distaste in the stressing of a political role for archaeology.

The processual - post-processual debate has raised many questions. Archaeologists in the Czech Republic have already dealt with some of these, and in the future they will undoubtedly continue to make their own unique contribution towards answering some of them, as can already be seen from the present series of papers.

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